An Opus code review of the branch caught two real bugs the test suite
structurally couldn't see:
- /revocation and /introspect were never added to bootstrap/app.php's
CSRF except list, so both were fully broken (403) for any real
external client, despite every feature test passing — CSRF
verification is short-circuited entirely while running tests.
Verified live against the running app before and after the fix, and
added a regression test that asserts against the actual configured
exemptions rather than relying on request-time behavior that tests
can't exercise.
- An array-shaped `token` param (e.g. token[]=a&token[]=b) crashed
both endpoints with a 500, since this app promotes PHP warnings
("Array to string conversion") to exceptions. Fixed at the shared
root, MicropubToken::findActive(), which also closes the same latent
hole in VerifyMicropubToken's access_token param that predates this
branch. Verified live and covered with regression tests.
Also applied the review's lower-severity findings: added the missing
introspection_endpoint Link header and metadata test assertions,
removed the now-dead is_string($scopes) array branch in the Micropub
handlers and media controller (scope is unconditionally a string from
the DB now, this guarded against a JWT-array-claim shape that can no
longer occur), dropped a redundant #[Table] model attribute, sized
token_hash to its actual 64-char length, and removed a one-off inline
style in the admin view.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014625MfkGZ7GVdbqKme4a8L
Lets a resource server (or a client checking its own token, via
self-introspection) verify a token's active/me/client_id/scope without
needing to be tightly coupled to this token endpoint. Requires the
caller to present their own currently-active token as authorization,
per spec's requirement that the endpoint MUST require some form of
authorization. Inactive tokens get back only {"active": false}, no
detail on why, matching the privacy stance already used for
revocation.
Pulled the hash-and-lookup-active-token logic (now needed a third
time) into MicropubToken::findActive(), used by this, the revocation
endpoint, and VerifyMicropubToken.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014625MfkGZ7GVdbqKme4a8L
Tokens now store a hashed row in micropub_tokens instead of being
self-contained signed JWTs, so a leaked or unwanted token can actually
be revoked. Since revocation already requires a DB lookup on every
request, JWT's stateless-verification benefit was gone anyway, so this
also drops the lcobucci/jwt dependency entirely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014625MfkGZ7GVdbqKme4a8L
